Journal of Economics and Social Sciences (JESS)
Vol. 4, 1 (January-June, 2025), pp. 119-128
EISSN: 2808-5094, DOI: 10.59525/jess.v4i1.682

The Influence of Good Corporate Governance and Firm Size on Earning Management in Automotive Companies Listed on the IDX in 2019 - 2023

Alfin Nazlil Khanif[1], Sutarni[2]

[1] Universitas Amikom Yogyakarta; Indonesia; alfinfiin14@gmail.com
[2] Universitas Amikom Yogyakarta; Indonesia; sutarni@amikom.ac.id

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

good corporate governance;
firm size;
earnings management;
automotive companies

Article history:

Received 2025-03-23
Revised 2025-04-24
Accepted 2025-05-18

ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance on earnings management; the effect of firm size on earnings management; and the combined effect of good corporate governance and firm size on earnings management in automotive companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2019–2023 period. This research adopts a quantitative approach, with data collected through documentation of financial reports from companies that meet the purposive sampling criteria. The data were analyzed using multiple linear regression with the assistance of SPSS version 26. The results indicate that good corporate governance has a positive and significant effect on earnings management; firm size has a negative and significant effect on earnings management; and good corporate governance and firm size simultaneously have a significant effect on earnings management in automotive companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2019–2023 period.

Corresponding Author:
Alfin Nazlil Khanif
Universitas Amikom Yogyakarta; Indonesia; alfinfiin14@gmail.com

1. INTRODUCTION

Financial statements are an important source of information for various parties in economic decision-making. Accounting information submitted through financial statements should ideally be prepared according to applicable standards so that it can be reliable. However, in practice, financial statements can be legally manipulated through certain accounting policies carried out by management to achieve personal goals. This phenomenon is known as earning management or profit management (Khuong et al., 2019).

Profit management is one of the main issues in accounting because it has a wide impact, not only economically, but also ethically. The asymmetry of information between management as an agent and the owner of the company as a principal is one of the causes of this practice. In this situation, the manager has more access to information than the owner and may choose to convey information that benefits him, even if it does not reflect the actual condition (Mahrani & Soewarno, 2018). Profits, which should be an objective indicator of company performance, can actually be engineered for certain interests.

According to Mayasari et al. (2019), profit management occurs when management is directly involved in the process of preparing financial statements to influence the perception of stakeholders, either by raising, decreasing, or leveling profits. Firnanti et al. (2019) explain that this practice generally arises due to a mismatch of interests between shareholders and management, as described in agency theory.

One of the mechanisms that is believed to be able to minimize profit management practices is the implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG). GCG is a framework that regulates the relationship between the board of commissioners, directors, shareholders, and other interested parties (Mafruhah, 2020). With a good GCG implementation, agency costs can be reduced and managers' opportunities to manipulate financial information can be minimized (Susanto et al., 2019). Today, the implementation of GCG is an important concern in almost all business sectors, as the demand for transparency and accountability increases.

Another factor that is suspected to have influenced profit management practices is firm size. Company size can be measured through total assets, log size, stock market value, and other indicators (Purnama & Taufiq, 2021). Large-scale companies tend to be more careful in compiling financial statements due to the spotlight from the public and larger regulators, so profit management is carried out more efficiently (Fathihani & Haris Nasution, 2021). Large companies generally have a higher level of stability and involve more parties in their operations, so the decisions taken have a wider effect on the public (Suheny, 2019). Therefore, large companies are assumed to be more likely to avoid profit management practices.

A real example of alleged profit management practices can be found in leading automotive companies such as Toyota. In the first quarter of 2017, Toyota reported a decline in profit for the first time in five years, despite an increase in vehicle sales compared to the previous period. Toyota revealed that exchange rate fluctuations and high costs are the main causes of declining profits (Setiawan, 2017). The company also issued a profit warning for the following year, signaling significant pressure on their financial performance. In this situation, there are allegations that the company is trying to manage its financial statements to maintain market confidence.

Profit management practices are not only limited to accounting recording engineering, but can also be in the form of policies that have a direct impact on the company's cash flow (Subramanyam, 2020). This is a serious concern because it has caused damage to business ethics and the financial integrity of the company (Manik, 2022).

Various previous studies have examined the factors that influence profit management practices. Regarding GCG, there are differences in the findings. Research by Mulyadi et al. (2024), Pangesti et al. (2023), and Rahmanjani et al. (2023) shows that GCG has a positive effect on profit management. However, other studies such as Saputra (2022) and Supatminingsih (2020) actually found a negative influence. Similarly, firm size, where several researchers such as Tetradia & Priantinah (2023), Fadhilah (2022), and Joe & Ginting (2022) stated that there was a positive and significant influence on profit management, while Rianto (2021) found the opposite influence.

This research offers novelty by taking the automotive sector as the object of study, a sector that is relatively rarely studied in the context of the influence of GCG and firm size on profit management. In addition, the period used, namely 2019–2023, covers the period before and after the COVID-19 pandemic, which also puts great pressure on the financial performance of companies, including automotive companies. This opens up the possibility of profit management practices to maintain the stability of financial statements amid extraordinary economic pressure.

Based on this background, this study aims to analyze the influence of Good Corporate Governance and firm size on earning management practices in automotive companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2019–2023 period.

2. METHODS

This study uses a quantitative approach with a secondary type of data obtained from the financial statements of automotive companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2019–2023 period. The population in this study is all automotive companies on the IDX as many as 12 companies, and the sample selection was carried out using purposive sampling techniques with the following criteria: (1) companies listed on the IDX in 2019–2023, (2) not delisted, and (3) having complete data related to the research variables. This study aims to analyze the influence of Good Corporate Governance (measured by the proportion of independent commissioners) and company size (calculated from the logarithm of total assets) on profit management (calculated using the Jones Modified Model).

The operational definitions of variables in this study include: (1) Good Corporate Governance (X1), which is measured from the ratio of independent commissioners to total commissioners; (2) Firm Size (X2), measured using natural logarithms of the company's total assets; and (3) Earnings Management (Y), calculated with Discretionary Accruals based on the Modified Jones Model in three stages, namely the calculation of total accruals (TA), estimated non-discretionary accruals (NDA), and the difference between TA and NDA as the value of discretionary accruals. These variables were chosen to test the structural influence and size of the company on management's tendency to engineer profits.

The data analysis technique used was multiple linear regression analysis with the help of the SPSS version 26 program, preceded by descriptive statistical analysis and classical assumption tests, including normality tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov), multicollinearity tests (VIF and Tolerance), and autocorrelation tests (Durbin-Watson). The documentation method is used as a data collection technique by examining financial statements and relevant documents from the IDX's official website and other legitimate sources.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Research Results

4.1.1 Individual Parameter Significance Test (T Test)

The significance test of individual parameters or the T test is used to determine the magnitude or small influence of each independent variable on the dependent variable. Independent variables can be said to have an effect on dependent variables if the significance probability value is less than 0.05 or 5%.

Table 4. 8 Results of Individual Parameter Significance Test

Coefficients[a]						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	14.408	2.683		5.369	.000
	Good_Corporate_Governance	18.698	4.151	.508	4.505	.000
	Firm_Size	-.040	.009	-.503	-4.462	.000
a. Dependent Variable: Earning_Management						

Source : Data processed with SPSS 26 (2025)

Based on the results of the Regression test above, the following can be formulated:

$$\mathbf{Y=14,408+18,698X_1-0,040X_2+e}$$

The explanation is as follows:

1. The constant of 14.408 means that if *the value of good corporate governance* and *firm size* does not change, then the *value of earning management* is 14.408.

2. The regression coefficient *of good corporate governance* is 18.698 (positive), which is calculated for every increase in *good corporate governance,* which will increase *earning management* by 18.698.
3. The firm size *regression coefficient* is -0.040 (negative), which means that every increase *in firm sie* by one unit, will decrease *earnings management* by 0.040.

Based on Table 4.8, the significance value is 0.000<0.005, which means that *good corporate governance* has a positive and significant effect on *earning management.* Thus, the research hypothesis that reads, "*Good corporate governance* has a significant positive effect on *earning management,"* **was accepted.**

Based on Table 4.8, the significance value is 0.000<0.005, which means that *firm size* has a negative and significant effect on *earnings management.* Thus, the research hypothesis that reads, "*firm size* has a significant positive effect on *earnings management,"* **is rejected.**

4.1.2 Test F

The F test or called the simultaneous significance test is a test used to find out whether all independent variables have a simultaneous effect on dependent variables. Independent variables can be said to have a simultaneous effect on dependent variables if they have a significance level of < 0.05.

Table 4. 9 Simultaneous Significance Test Results

ANOVA[a]						
Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	340.510	2	170.255	18.597	.000[b]
	Residual	384.512	42	9.155		
	Total	725.023	44			
a. Dependent Variable: Earning_Management						
b. Predictors: (Constant), Firm_Size, Good_Corporate_Governance						

Source : Data processed with SPSS 26 (2025)

Based on table 4.9 above, the simultaneous significance value or F test is obtained of 18,578 with a significance of 0.000, where the significance is smaller than 0.05 (α=5%), and F is calculated to be greater than F of the table (18,597 > 3.21) so that it can be concluded that *the variables of good corporate governance* and *firm size* have a joint effect on the *earning management variable.* Thus, the research hypothesis that reads, "*good corporate governance* and *firm size* simultaneously have a significant effect on *earning management variables,"* **was accepted.**

4.1.3 Coefficient of Determination Test (R2)

The Determination coefficient test (R2) is a test used to measure the ability of independent variables to interpret dependent variables. The value of R2 ranges from zero to one. If the value of the coefficient of determination is small, it indicates that the independent variable cannot provide the information needed to explain the dependent variable or in the sense that the independent variable has a fairly limited ability, while if the value of R2 is close to or equal to one thing, it means that the independent variable provides all the information needed to project all dependent variables.

Table 4. 10 Determination Coefficient Test Results

Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.685[a]	.470	.444	3.02573
a. Predictors: (Constant), Firm_Size, Good_Corporate_Governance				

Source : Data processed with SPSS 26 (2025)

Based on Table 4.10 above, the *Adjusted R Square* value is 0.444. This shows that *the variables of good corporate governance* and *firm size* simultaneously affect *earning management* by 44.4% and the remaining 55.6% are explained by other variables outside this study.

Discussion

4.1.4 The Influence of *Good Corporate Governance* on *Earning Management*

The results of the analysis show that *good corporate governance* proxied by the proportion of independent board of commissioners has a significant positive effect on *the earnings management* of automotive companies listed on the IDX in 2019 – 2023, with a significance value of 0.000<0.005.

Profit management is a practice carried out by the company's management to influence financial statements to suit certain interests, either to influence investors, increase the company's value, or meet financial targets. This significant positive influence shows that the existence of a higher independent board of commissioners tends to provide space for management to carry out profit management. This is contrary to the common assumption that an independent board of commissioners acts as an effective supervisor that reduces manipulation of financial statements.

One of the factors that can explain this positive influence is the weak supervision mechanism and limitations in the independence of the board of commissioners. Although independent boards of commissioners are supposed to act without management influence, in reality, many independent board members have social or economic attachments to management, so they are less likely to be completely independent in carrying out supervisory functions. In addition, in some cases, the board of commissioners may not have sufficient expertise or access to understand the complexities of financial statements, especially in a technical industry such as automotive.

Furthermore, the Agency's theory also highlights the importance of incentives for independent boards of commissioners in carrying out their supervisory functions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that to minimize agency problems, agents need to be given incentives that are in line with the interests of the owner. However, if the incentives of independent board of commissioners are more oriented towards short-term performance or specific financial targets, they may become more permissive towards profit management practices. This research indicates that in the context of automotive companies in Indonesia, such incentives may not have been designed effectively to support strong oversight of profit management.

These findings highlight the importance of improvements in good corporate governance practices in Indonesian automotive companies. One way to improve the effectiveness of independent boards of commissioners is to improve recruitment mechanisms and provide specialized training that focuses on financial oversight and financial reporting. With a better understanding of the automotive industry and the potential for financial manipulation, an independent board of commissioners is expected to be more effective in preventing profit management practices.

In conclusion, although the Agency's theory suggests that an independent board of commissioners can reduce agency problems such as profit management, the results of an analysis of automotive companies listed on the IDX show that the effect is actually significantly positive on profit management. This reflects the challenges that companies still face in implementing good corporate governance effectively, especially in ensuring that the independent board of commissioners is truly able to carry out its supervisory role.

The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Mulyadi et al. (2024), Pangesti et al. (2023), and Rahmanjani et al. (2023), which stated that *good corporate governance* has a positive effect on *earning management*. According to Mulyadi et al. (2024), this positive influence occurs due to pressure from shareholders and management to achieve certain financial targets.

4.1.5 The Effect of Firm Size on Earning Management

The results of the analysis show that *firm size* has a negative and significant effect on the *earnings management* of automotive companies listed on the IDX in 2019 – 2023, with a significance value of 0.000<0.005

This means that the larger the size of the company, the less likely it is to perform profit management. Large company size is usually associated with stronger oversight capabilities, both internally and externally, which in turn reduces the manager's tendency to manipulate financial reporting.

In large companies, the supervisory and governance structures of the company are more sophisticated, thereby reducing information asymmetry between managers and owners. Stricter supervision from shareholders, auditors, and government regulations makes it more difficult for large companies to perform profit management. This is consistent with research by Watts and Zimmerman (1986) which states that large corporations have higher political costs if they engage in financial manipulation practices, so they tend to avoid such practices.

In addition, large companies are generally more scrutinized by the public and external stakeholders such as regulators and the media. The reputation of a large company is very important, and profit management practices can have a detrimental impact on a company's image. Therefore, companies with large sizes tend to adhere more to stricter financial reporting standards to maintain the integrity of their financial statements. Research conducted by Dechow and Schrand (2020) supports this argument, finding that large companies are more focused on maintaining long-term reputations than pursuing short-term profits through profit manipulation.

Furthermore, the larger size of the company is also related to the use of more advanced technology and more transparent information systems. Large companies typically have infrastructure that supports more accurate and integrated financial reporting. This system helps reduce the possibility of errors or deliberate irregularities in financial statements. A robust internal control system also minimizes the manager's chances of manipulating profits. Thus, large firm sizes create mechanisms that prevent profit management practices through better systems.

External oversight of large companies also contributes to the reduction of profit management. Large companies are often the subject of attention from financial analysts, the media, and regulators, which significantly increases external scrutiny of their financial statements. This oversight makes large companies more transparent and increases management accountability. According to research by Hope and Thomas (2018), large companies with a wider shareholder base and international exposure are also more frequently audited by large audit firms, which tend to have higher standards in ensuring the quality of financial reporting.

In conclusion, the results of this analysis show that company size has a significant negative influence on profit management practices in automotive companies listed on the IDX. Large companies with better oversight systems, both internal and external, are more likely to produce honest and transparent financial statements, reducing profit management opportunities.

The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Tetradia & Priantinah (2023), Afifah Fadhilah (2022), and Joe & Ginting (2022), firm size has a negative and significant effect on *earnings management*. The studies show that larger companies tend to find it more difficult to perform profit management practices because they have more internal and external oversight. In addition, large companies also have more complex organizational structures and more stakeholders who monitor financial performance so that it can reduce the incentive to manipulate financial statements.

4.1.6 The Influence of Good Corporate Governance and Firm Size on Earning Management

The results of the analysis show that *good corporate governance* and *firm size* simultaneously have a significant effect on the *earnings management of* automotive companies listed on the IDX in 2019 – 2023, with a simultaneous significance value or F test of 18,578 with a significance of 0.000 where the value is smaller than 0.05 and F is calculated to be greater than F table (18,597 >3.21).

The simultaneous influence between these two variables confirms that good corporate governance mechanisms and company size are important factors in controlling profit manipulation practices in automotive companies. The combination of effective supervision and large corporate scale helps minimize the practice of manipulation of financial statements by management.

Firm *size* also plays an important role in reducing profit management. Larger companies tend to have more complex and stronger internal control systems, as well as more stringent scrutiny from various external stakeholders, such as investors, financial analysts, and the media. Research conducted by Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (2018) shows that large companies tend to face more scrutiny from the market, so they have a lower incentive to perform profit management. This oversight makes large companies more focused on long-term sustainability than short-term gains through profit manipulation.

The combination of GCG and firm size creates an environment where managers have a lower incentive to do profit management. In companies that implement good governance and have a large size, there is strict oversight from an independent board of commissioners as well as an effective audit system, all of which play a role in ensuring the accuracy and transparency of financial statements. Research by Beasley (2016) found that having a strong independent board of commissioners reduces the likelihood of companies manipulating profits, while the large size of the company strengthens this mechanism with more resources to implement strict supervision.

In addition, large companies tend to be more exposed to the capital market and the public. Therefore, their reputation is crucial to maintaining the trust of investors and regulators. *Good corporate governance* helps large companies in maintaining the credibility and integrity of their financial statements. When GCG mechanisms are implemented well, managers find it more difficult to hide information or manipulate financial statements because there is a stricter audit process and higher transparency. The size of a company reinforces the impact of good governance because large companies are generally more overseen by regulators and external auditors who are more credible.

The significant influence between GCG, firm size, and earning management also reflects the importance of integrating corporate governance with appropriate management policies. Automotive companies listed on the IDX during the 2019-2023 period tend to experience increased accountability when these two factors run simultaneously. Good corporate governance allows companies to manage conflicts of interest effectively, while large company sizes provide greater ability to enforce controls and transparency.

The results of this study are in line with the research of Tiong & Sumari (2022) which states that *Good Corporate Governance* and *firm size* have a simultaneous and significant effect on *earning management*. The study also confirms that despite greater supervision, both factors can simultaneously worsen *earning management* practices, suggesting an interaction between the influence *of Good Corporate Governance* and company size on profit management policies within the company.

4. CONCLUSION

This study aims to empirically examine how the influence of good corporate governance (GCG) and firm size on earning management practices in automotive companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2019–2023 period. Data is obtained from the annual financial statements published by each company. This study uses a quantitative approach with regression analysis to test the relationship between these variables, both partially and simultaneously. The main focus of this study is to see the extent to which good corporate governance practices and company size can be factors influencing managerial decisions in managing profits.

The results of the analysis show that good corporate governance has a significant and positive influence on earning management, which indicates that the better the implementation of GCG, the higher the likelihood of management managing profits. On the other hand, firm size shows a significant and negative influence on earnings management, meaning that the larger the company's size, the lower the tendency to do profit management. Simultaneously, these two variables have been proven to have a significant effect on earning management. These findings confirm the importance of paying attention to aspects of governance and company size in an effort to oversee and control managerial practices that can affect the quality of financial reporting.

REFERENCES

Abdul Rachman Sahrani. (2016). Pengaruh Arus Kas Operasi Terhadap Dividen Kas Pada Perusahaan Sektor Barang Dan Konsumsi Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia. *Applied Microbiology And Biotechnology*, *85*(1), 6.

Achmad, M. D. (2005). *Good Corporate Governance: Konsep Dan Penerapannya Dalam Konteks Indonesia*. Ray Indonesia.

Adhianto, D. (2020). Investasi Reksa Dana Sebagai Alternatif Investasi Bagi Investor Pemula. *Jurnal E-Bis (Ekonomi-Bisnis)*, *4*(1), 32–44. Https://Doi.Org/10.37339/E-Bis.V4i1.242

Afifah Fadhilah, A. K. (2022). Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahan, Arus Kas Bebas, Leverage, Dan Profitabilitas Terhadap Manajemen Laba. *Jurnal Ilmiah Komputerisasi Akuntansi*, *15*(1), 25–37.

Bambang Riyanto. (2012). *Dasar-Dasar Pembelanjaan Perusahaan*. Gpfe.

Fathihani, F., & Haris Nasution, I. (2021). Pengaruh Struktur Modal, Pertumbuhan Perusahaan, Profitabilitas, Dan Ukuran Perusahaan Terhadap Manajemen Laba (Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Pertambangan Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2016-2018). *Jurnal Bisnis, Ekonomi, Manajemen, Dan Kewirausahaan*, *1*(1), 61–70. Https://Doi.Org/10.52909/Jbemk.V1i1.29

Firnanti, F., Pirzada, K., & Budiman, B. (2019). Company Characteristics, Corporate Governance, Audit Quality Impact On Earnings Management. *Gatr Accounting And Finance Review*, *4*(2), 43–49. Https://Doi.Org/10.35609/Afr.2019.4.2(2)

Imam Ghozali. (2016). *Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate Dengan Program Ibm Spss 23*. Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro.

Imam Ghozali. (2018). *Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate Dengan Program Ibm Spss 25*. Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro.

Joe, S., & Ginting, S. (2022). *Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan , Leverage , Dan Profitabilitas Terhadap Manajemen Laba The Influence Of Firm Size , Leverage , And Profitability On Earnings Management*. *5*(2), 1641–1648. Https://Doi.Org/10.34007/Jehss.V5i2.1520

Khuong, N. V., Ha, N. T. T., & Thu, P. A. (2019). The Relationship Between Real Earnings Management And Firm Performance: The Case Of Energy Firms In Vietnam. *International Journal Of Energy Economics And Policy*, *9*(2), 307–314. Https://Doi.Org/10.32479/Ijeep.7469

Mafruhah, H. (2020). Pengaruh Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Pajak Perusahaan Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia. *Jurnal Revenue: Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi*, *1*(1), 32–52. Https://Doi.Org/10.46306/Rev.V1i1.5

Mahrani, M., & Soewarno, N. (2018). The Effect Of Good Corporate Governance Mechanism And Corporate Social Responsibility On Financial Performance With Earnings Management As Mediating Variable. *Asian Journal Of Accounting Research*, *3*(1), 41–60. Https://Doi.Org/10.1108/Ajar-06-2018-0008

Manik, V. T. (2022). Manajemen Laba Ditinjau Dari Sudut Pandang Praktisi Dan Akademisi. *Diss Universitas Hkbp Nommensen*.

Mawardani, R. K., Baidlowi, I., Nugraha, R. T., & Aniyah, N. (2023). Pengaruh Gcg, Firm Size Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan Dengan Kinerja Keuangan Sebagai Variabel Moderating. *Jurnal Ilmu Riset Manajemen Bisnis Dan Akuntansi*, *1*(3).

Mayasari, M., Yuliandini, A., & Permatasari, I. I. (2019). The Influence Of Corporate Governance, Company Size, And Leverage Toward Earning Management. *Jurnal Akuntansi Trisakti*, *6*(1), 19–30. Https://Doi.Org/10.25105/Jat.V6i1.4869

Mulyadi, O., Petra, B. A., & Rici, S. A. (2024). The Effect Of Good Corporate Governance, Company Growth, Company Size And Earnings Management On Capital Structure. *Economics And Digital …*, *5*(2), 987–996. Https://Garuda.Kemdikbud.Go.Id/Documents/Detail/4008266

Nofita Dwi Rustiyani, M. G. K. I. (2024). The Effect Of Corporate Governance On Earnings Management With Audit Quality As A Moderating Variable. *Journal Of Economic, Business And Accounting*, *7*.

Pangesti, S. I., Pratami, Y., & Nursida, N. (2023). *Disclosure On Earnings Management Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Dan Pengungkapan Corporate Social Responsibility Terhadap Manajemen Laba*. *4*(April), 2503–2518.

Purnama, Y. M., & Taufiq, E. (2021). Pengaruh Profitabilitas, Leverage, Firm Size, Dan Earnings Power Terhadap Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan Sektor Properti Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2017-2019. *Journal Of Accounting, Finance, Taxation, And Auditing (Jafta)*, *3*(1), 71–94. Https://Doi.Org/10.28932/Jafta.V3i1.3280

Rahmanjani, A. D., Mulyadi, M., & Sianipar, P. B. H. (2023). Pengaruh Perencanaan Pajak Dan Beban Pajak Tangguhan Terhadap Manajemen Laba Dengan Good Corporate Governance Sebagai Variabel Moderasi Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Periode 2018-2021. *Jurnal Riset Ilmu Akuntansi*, *2*(3), 145–169.

Rianto, R. (2021). Analisis Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan, Financial Stability, Dan External Pressureterhadap Earning Management Denganfinancial Targetssebagai Variabel Moderasi. *Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Keuangan*, *3*(1), 58–71.

Santoso, S. (2012). *Panduan Lengkap Spss Versi 20*. Pt Elex Media Komputindo.

Scott, W. R. (2015). *Financial Accounting Theory* (7th Ed.). Pearson Canada Inc.

Sri Supatminingsih, M. W. (2020). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance, Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Intelectual Capital Terhadap Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar Di Bei. *Edunomika*, *04*(01), 114–125.

Sugiyono. (2017). *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif, Kualitatif, Dan R&D*. Alfabeta, Cv.

Sugiyono. (2018). *Metode Penelitian Kuantitatif Kualitatif Dan R&D*. Alfabeta.

Sugiyono. (2019). *Metodelogi Penelitian Kuantitatif Dan Kualitatif Dan R&D*. Alfabeta.

Suheny, E. (2019). Pengaruh Corporate Governance, Ukuran Perusahaan, Leverage, Dan Kualitas Audit Terhadap Manajemen Laba. *Jurnal Ekonomi Vokasi*, *2*(1), 1–18.

Sujarweni, V. W. (2019). *Analisis Laporan Keuangan : Teori, Aplikasi, Dan Hasil Penelitian.* Pustaka Baru Press.

Surahati Tarigan, P., Macia Sari, M., Purnama, I., Sumarti, T., Jendral Gatot Subroto, J. K., Sikambing, S., & Puti Surahati Tarigan, M. (2024). Korelasi Dan Implementasi Good Corporate Governance Tentang Kinerja Financial Dan Dampaknya Pada Pelayanan Publik Perusahaan Swasta , Rumah Sakit, Pemerintahan, Bumn Serta Perguruan Tinggi. *Jurnal Kajian Dan Penalaran Ilmu Manajemen*, *2*(2), 10–24. Https://Doi.Org/10.59031/Jkpim.V2i2.385

Susanto, Y. K., Pirzada, K., & Adrianne, S. (2019). Is Tax Aggressiveness An Indicator Of Earnings Management? *Polish Journal Of Management Studies*, *20*(2), 516–527. Https://Doi.Org/10.17512/Pjms.2019.20.2.43

Syarina, D. P. (2016). Analisis Pengaruh Nilai Tukar Rupiah, Inflasi Dan Indeks Dow Jones Terhadap Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan (Ihsg) Di Bursa Efek Indonesia (Bei). *543 Kindai*, *16*(3), 1–23.

Tetradia, K., & Priantinah, D. (2023). Pengaruh Leverage, Cash Holding, Ukuran Perusahaan, Dan Kualitas Audit Terhadap Manajemen Laba Dengan Kepemilikan Manajerial Sebagai Variabel Moderasi. *Nominal Barometer Riset Akuntansi Dan Manajemen*, *12*(2), 227–241.

Tiong, P., & Sumari, J. (2022). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Dan Firm Size Terhadap Earning Management Pada Perusahaan Food Dan Beverage Yang Tercatat Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Di Masa Pandemi Covid 19. *Bata Ilyas Educational Management Review*, *2*(2), 115–128.

V. Wiratna Sujarweni. (2017). *Metodologi Penelitian Bisnis & Ekonomi*. Graha Ilmu.

Vioaldy Eprilian Saputra, Maria Rio Rita, I. M. S. (2022). Efek Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap. *Modus*, *34*(1), 1–23.

Wiratna, S. (2015). *Spss Untuk Penelitian*. Pustaka Baru Press.

Yoga Putra Meyditiyaa, Sonya Ajeng Wahyu Nastitib, I. I. A. (2024). Pengaruh Corporate Governance, Profitabilitas, Leverage, Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Gender Diversityterhadap Manajemen Laba. *Jimat*, *1*(4), 1–15.

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (2021). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.

Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., & Tehranian, H. (2019). Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), 412-430.

Dechow, P. M., & Schrand, C. M. (2004). Earnings quality. Research Foundation of CFA Institute.

Hope, O.-K., & Thomas, W. B. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 591-626.

Beasley, M. S. (2016). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465.

Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (2018). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.